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Constitutional Law-Conflict of Laws..-[California] A film company
hired three airplanes through defendant brok'rage firm for the filming of
a parachute jump over the Pacific Ocean. Two were cabin planes from
which the pictures were to be taken; the other was to carry the parachute
jumper. While flying over the bay, the two cabin planes, in attempting to
make a left turn, crashed into each other and both fell into the ocean,
carrying all the occupants to their death. Plaintiffs, the representatives of
the deceased employees of the film company, alleged negligence in general
terms under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.t Plaintiffs appealed from a
judgment for defendant, assigning as error (inter alia) the exclusion of a
document issued by the Department of Commerce of the United States con-
taining "Air Commerce Regulations" relating to the licensing of aircraft and
the rules of air traffic. Held: the document was properly excluded. Parker
v. James E. Granger, Inc., 90 Cal. Dec. 475, 52 P. (2d) 226 (Supreme Court,
November 29, 1935).2
The Supreme Court, in ruling that the rejection of such evidence was
correct, stated: (1) that the court would take.judicial notice of such official
acts and regulations; and (2) that, taking such notice, it could find nothing
therein which the court was called upon to declare to the jury; that the
flight of the planes was purely intrastate; and that, under the federal Con-
stitution and the California Air Navigation Act,$ the State of California
was vested with the exclusive power to prescribe air traffic rules to govern
the operation of aircraft in flying a purely intrastate flight.
The facts do not indicate what part of the federal air traffic rules were
thought by plaintiffs to be applicable in the instant case, but, presumptively,
they sought to show a violation of the rules of flight. However, the court,
by its statement that exclusive control was vested in the State of California,
indicated that it would have given no consideration to the rules had they
been admitted and a violation thereof shown. This statement raises the
question: Are purely intrastate flights subject to federal control?
The "commerce clause" 4 of the Constitution was relied on by Congress
as being the most appropriate and effective basis for federal control over
aviation. The Air Commerce Act of 19265 left the power divided between
the nation and the states.
The so-called "burden theory," developed by the railroad, 6 the radio7
1. For discussion on the negligence point, see comment on page 283.
2. On hearing, 80 Cal. App. Dec. 210, 39 P. (2d) 833 (1934).
3. Cal. Deering's Gen. Laws (1931), Act No. 151, Cal. Stats. (1929), p.
1874.
4. U. S. Const, Art. 1, §8(3).
5. Act of May 20, 1926, as amended by the Act of June 19, 1934, c. 654,
§§11, 12, 48 Stat. at L. 1115, 49 U. S. C. §181(5).6. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 213 U. S. 175, 29 Sup. Ct. 451, 53L. Ed. 753 (1909) ; Southern Ry. V. United States, 222 U. S. 20, 32 Sup. Ct. 2,
56 L. Ed. 72 (1911) ; Texas and Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct.482, 60 L. Ed. 874 (1916) : Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 257
U. S. 563. 42 Sup. Ct. 232, 66 L. Ed. 371, 22 A. L. R. 1086 (1922); St. Paul,M. & M. Ry. v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry., 68 F. 2 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895), aftd., 18
Sup. Ct. 946, 42 L. Ed. 1212 (1897).
7. American Bond & Mortgage Co. v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 318 (C.
C. A. 7th. 1931) ; Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comnission,
62 F. (2d) 850 (App. D. C. 1932).
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and the navigable water 8 cases, by which federal control of both interstate
and intrastate commerce was secured, is clearly stated by Mr. Chief Justice
Taft in Railroad Con mmission v. Chicago B. & Q. Railway Company:9
"Commerce is a unit and does not regard state lines, and while under
the Constitution interstate and intrastate commerce are ordinarily subject to
regulation by different sovereignties, yet when they are so mingled together
that the supreme authority, the Nation, cannot exercise effective control
over interstate commerce, such incidental regulation is not an invasion of
state authority."
It is recognized that the regulation of the act of flying 'Within the state
is primarily a matter of state regulation, and that the federal government
may not enter that field except where necessary to prevent interference
with, or discrimination against, or interruption of, or a burden upon, inter-
state commerce; or except when it is necessary, in the effective regulation
of interstate commerce, incidentally to regulate intrastate commerce.
In Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Comipany,'0 the court, in
extending the "burden" principle to air flights, held that the Air Traffic Rules
would apply to intrastate commerce if necessary. Again, in Swetland v.
Curtis Airport," the same decision was reached, although there is some doubt
as to whether or not the court in that case would have held the Air Traffic
Rules applicable to intrastate commerce in that state had it not been for the
evident intention of the State of Ohio that they should apply.
All air space is navigable with no defined routes. An intrastate plane
in the air loses its character as such and, if operating under conflicting state
regulations, may not only interfere with, and impede, planes engaged ill
interstate commerce, but it may be a constant source of danger both
to passengers and to property. Again, where there is a conflict between
levels at which planes may operate or perform acrobatics, the pilot of an
interstate plane coming into a busy airport or making a forced landing would
not know what to expect.
The United States Supreme Court has had as yet no opportnunity to
consider the question presented by the principal case. To eliminate inter-
ference with interstate commerce and to provide for the common safety
of all, it no doubt will recognize the necessity of federal control of the air
tinder the "burden theory," as it has in the past in other fields.
ARTHUR J. O'KEciE.1
Contracts-Employee Inventions-Airline Pilots.-For some time it
has been a common practice with large manufacturing corporations to exact
of their employees-or at least of those employees whose work is closely
related to the manufacturing processes, or who are engaged in research and
experimenting-contracts whereby the employee agrees that any invention
made by him during the employment, relating in any way to the business of
8. The Oyster Police Steamers of Maryland, 31 F. 763 (D. C. Md. 1887) ;
The Governor Robert McLane v. United States, 35 F. 926 (C. C. Md. 1888),
aff'g 31 F. 763 (1887).
9. Railroad Commission v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 257 U. S. 563, 588, 42
Sup. Ct. 232. 237, 66 L. Ed. 371. 383, 22 A. L. R. 1086, 1089 (1922).
10. 35 F. (2d) 761 (D. C. Ohio 1929), discussed in: 3 Southern California
Law review, 413, 420 (1930) : 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 359 (1930).
11. 41 F. (2d) 929 (D. C. Ohio 1930).
12. School of Law, University of Southern California.
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the corporation, shall belong to the corporation. It is understood that re-
cently various air line companies have attempted to obtain such contracts
from their employees, including the pilots and co-pilots. 1 In general, the
reason behind such contracts in the United States is the existence of the
patent laws, 2 which give to the inventor of a patentable article (which is
in fact patented) a protective franchise for the duration of the patent.3
The patent law also provides that application for all patents must be by the
•inventor. 4  As a result of this legislation, the only way in which a corpo-
ration may assure itself of the benefit and use of improvements in its proc-
esses which are invented by its employees, and patented by them, is to secure
contracts from them in advance, assigning the inventor's interest to the
corporation.5 When it is considered that the corporation acts only through
1. An editorial on this subject by Lionel G. Thorsness may be found in
Vol. IV, No. 12 of the Air Line Pilot. It is understandable that a manufacturing
corporation has a vital interest in securing the possession of any improvements
that affect it. It is not so clear why the air line companies, most of which
are technically "operating" companies and not manufacturing companies, except
through associated or subsidiary companies, should seek to acquire in this way
the inventions of their employees. A typical emploEpent agreement reads as
follows:
"In consideration of the salary paid to me by ...........................
... ...... ............... ............................... a corporation of
the State of , and of the position which I occupy, I hereby
agree that any Inventions, improvements and/or developments that I may make,
invent, acquire and/or suggest during my employment by said Corporation
relating generally to any process, method, apparatus, article of manufacture or
thing, directly or indirectly of interest to said Corporation connected in any
way with or relating to the work, tests or future developments, and/or products
of the Corporation, shall become the absolute property of said Corporation, and
I will, at any time at the request of said Corporation, either during my em-
ployment or afterwards, and for the consideration above named, execute any
papers by way of applications, assignments, or otherwise, relative to such in-
ventions or improvements, as well as any papers that said Corporation may
consider necessary or helpful in the prosecution of applications for patents
thereon in the United States or foreign countries or which may relate to any
litigation, interference and/or controversy in connection therewith, without
further consideration, and, if I leave the employ of said Corporation, I will, at
any time, thereafter, and upon its request, execute any such papers as it may
desire, all at the expense of said Corporation, and agree that the entird control,
prosecution and conduct of all such matters shall be solely within the control of
said Corporation and at Its expense; and I further agree to give any evidence,
testimony and produce any data and/or documents which may be helpful to
the Corporation in connection with the foregoing, either during the period of
my employment or thereafter; and I further agree not to reveal any of the
information which I may acquire on the confidential matters of the Corporation
while with the Corporation, either during my employment by it, or afterwards,
and agree not to deliver any documents, copies thereof or reveal the contents
thereof with relation to the patent applications, research and/or development
work of the Corporation, either while I am with the Corporation or after the
termination of my employment by it."
2. By the Constitution of the United States, Article 1, Section 8, it is
provided that "Congress shall have power . . . t6 promote the progress of
science and the useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." The con-
stitutional grant of power has been given effect by carefully expanded statutes.
For a codification of the existing statutes see 35 USC; 35 USCA.
3. "The franchise which the patent grants, consists altogether in the right
to exclude everyone from making, using, or vending the thing patented, without
the permission of the patentee. This is all that he obtains by the patent."
Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U. S. 539 (1852) ; United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 258 U. S. 451, 42 S. Ct. 585 (1921). Gladney, Restraints of
Trade in Patented Articles (1910), is a book devoted to explaining the nature
of the franchise. Patent rights are property. Brown V. Duchesne, 60 U. S. 195(1856) ; Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U. S. 405,
28 S. Ct. 748 (1908).
4. In McCrady, Patent Office Practice (1928), §58, it is suggested that an
assignee can never make the original application, because the Constitution
requires that the protection run to the inventor. See 16 Stat. 202, 583 (1871)
35 USCA §44 (1927). Exception is made when the inventor dies, or becomes
insane. In such case, the application is by his legal representative. See 30
Stat. 915 (1899), 32 Stat. 1226 (1903), 35 Stat. 245 (1908) ; 35 USCA §46 (1927).
5. In the absence of statute, the situation would be different, for monop-
olies are not sanctioned by the common law, and although a patent is not
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individuals, that it of necessity entrusts these individuals with power and
responsibility, and that any improvement that the corporation contemplates
must be effected through these individuals, it becomes apparent that, in at
least some instances, the corporation is justified in requiring such contracts.8
In any discussion of the employer's right to the fruits of the employee's
inventive genius which have been patented by the employee, the analysis
must be of a dual nature; consideration must be given to the property in the
invention itself as well as to the property in the patent obtained for that
invention. The property in the invention arises out of the inventive act
and consists of the right to practice the invention, including the rights to
make, use, and sell the object of the invention; 7 the property in the patent
arises out of the grant by the sovereign acting under the positive law and
consists of the right to prevent all persons except the patentee from prac-
ticing the invention, including the rights to prohibit its making, use, or sale
except by such persons and on such terms as the patentee may prescribe,
and to obtain redress for its illegal making, use, or sale.8 The first of
these elements exists irrespective of the second and does not depend on
whether there is a patent. It may be transferred by the inventor, and so
long as it be known only to the inventor and the transferee their enjoyment
of its benefits may be exclusive, but where others become familiar with the
invention, mere ownership of the invention does not confer the legal right
to prevent its general use.9 The second element-the patent-is necessary
to prevent unrestricted use of the invention. The invention may be freely
alienated to one or more persons, but such alienation does not carry with
it the protection of the patent as a means of preventing others from making
use of the invention. The right acquired by the transferee in this case is
known as a license. 10 The patent may also be alienated, but not in the un-
restricted way in which it is possible to alienate the invention alone." The
reason for the limitation is that it would be impossible for each of two
independent persons to possess the power to prohibit the practice of an in-
vention in the same territory. Conveyances of 'patents are known as assign-
ments and grants.12 Provision is made in the patent law for conveyances of
this sort either at the time of the granting of the patent or during its
subsequent life.' s
From the discussion in the preceding paragraph it may be seen that
technically a monopoly, the same reasoning would apply, resulting in an unre-
stricted public use of the invention. See 1 Walker, Patents (6th ed. 1929),§§1-14, 197-199. Brown v. Duchesne, supra note 3.
6. The language of the text is qualified because it is easy to conceive of
situations where the employment, and the special knowledge therein acquired,
did not in any way contribute to the idea or its subsequent successful develop-
ment. In such cases it might seem unfair to compel the surrender of theinvention to the employer, especially if the development has not been at the
expense of the employer.
7. 2 Robinson. Patents (1890). §753.
8. 2 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 7, §753. Bloomer v. McQuewan, supra
note 3.
9. Supra note 5. Summerhays v. Scheu, 52 P. (2d) 512 (Cal. App. 1935).
10. 2 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 7, §760; 1 Walker, op. cit. supra note
5. §343 ; McCrady, op. cit. supra note 4, §287. See Goyler v. Wilder, 51 U. S. 477(1850).
11. Alienation of the patent carries with it as incidental thereto theproperty In the invention. See 2 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 7, §§756, 758.
12. 1 Walker, op. cit. supra note 5, §}319. 334; 2 Robinson, op. cit. supra
note 7, §759. An assignment passes the entire title to the patent; a grant
passes the entire interest for a restricted area.
13. 16 Stat. 202 (1870). 16 Stat. 583 (1871) ; 35 USCA §44 (1927). 29Stat. 693 (1897), 42 Stat. 391 (1922) ; 35 USCA §47 (1927).
. NOTES, COMMENTS, DIGESTS
there are, in general, two types of interests that the employer may claim
in the patented inventions of his employee, assignments and licenses.'
4
Normally the employer would prefer to obtain an assignment because of the
greater protection it affords him through possession of the right to prevent
others from making use of the invention. Because of its relatively greater
value to the employer, the assignment will be considered before dealing with
the license in this comment. It may be stated as a general rule that the
mere fact of the relationship of employer and employee will not necessarily
entitle the former to inventions made by the latter along the line of the
employment. Ordinarily an express contract to assign the patent, or the
interests of the inventor is necessary, and this will not be implied in law
merely because of the relationship of the parties. 5 However, the fact that
the contract of employment does not contain an express provision to the
effect that inventions made by the employee shall belong to the employer does
not prevent the employer from making claim to the inventions where other
circumstances induce this result. 6
Where the parties have expressly contracted that the inventions of the
employee shall belong to the employer, construction of the contract and the
determination of its validity is a matter of contract law and not of patent
law.1 7 In the past the validity of such contracts has been attacked on nu-
merous grounds, but it has been generally held that a properly drafted con-
tract is not open to the objections of being void as against public policy, of
being unconsciously, or of being lacking in mutuality..' s  If the contract
to assign is entered into at the same time as the contract of employment, it
will ordinarily be held that there is valid consideration to support the agree-
ment, on the theory that this constituted part of the consideration for obtain-
taining the employment.'9  If the contract to assign is entered into after
the employment has commenced, and no additional consideration is given,
normally the contract will be held void as lacking in consideration.20 If the
14. Separate consideration is not given to the grant which differs from the
assignment only in that a more limited territorial area is included. Supra
note 12.
15. Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U. S. 226, 7 S. Ct. 193 (1886) ; Dalzell v. Dueber
Watch Case MIg. Co., 149 U. S. 315, 13 S. Ct. 886 (1893); Pressed Steel Car
Co. v. Hansen."137 F. 403 (C. C. A. 3d, 1905) ; U. S. Colloid Mill Corp. v. Myers,
6 F. Supp. 283 (1934); American Cyanamid Co. v. HubbelV, 76 . (2d) 807
(C. C. A. 3d, 1935) ; Miller & Co. v. Beagen, - Mass. -, 199 N. E. 344 (1935).
For annotations and comment on this subject see 16 A. L. R. 1512; 32 A. L. R.
1037; 44 A. L. R. 593; 85 A. L. R. 1512; 20 A. B. A. Jour. 538 (1934).
16. Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U. S. 583 (1869) ; Howard v. Howe,
61 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932) ; Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, 69 F. (2d)
577 (C. C. A. 7th. 1934).
17. The patent law permits of assignments. See supra note 13.
18. Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 F. 864 (C. C. A. 4th, 1895) ; Thompson
V. Automatic Fire Protection Co.. 211 F. 120 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914) ; Guth v. Min-
nesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 72 F. (2d) 385 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) ; DuPont Rayon Co.
v. Paley, 4 F. Supp. 290 (1933). A case reaching opposite result on its peculiar
facts is Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 14 F. (2d) 776 (1926). There
are many cases sustaining contracts of this sort, where the court in its decision
sustains the contracts without mention of these objections. See New Jersey
Zinc Co. v. Singmaster, 71 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; Standard Parts Co.
V. Peck, 264 U. S. 52, 44 S. Ct. 239 (1924) ; Oliver v. Autographic Register Co.,
118 N. J. Eq. 72, 177 A. 680 (1935) ; Quaker St. Oil Refining Co. v. Talbot,
315 Pa. 517, 174 A. 99 (1934).
19. 3 Williston. Contracts (1920). §1643. .Wege V. Safe-Cabinet Co., 249
F. 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918). If the employment be an employment at will, the
result would probably be contra. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller,
supra note 18.
20. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller. supra note 18; Treat v. Ellis,
6 Alaska 290 (1920) ; Young v. Schwint, 108 Kan. 425, 195 Pac. 614 (1921).
An analogous case in another field of the law is Davis & Co. V. Morgan, 117
Ga. 504, 43 S. E. 732 (1903). Anson, Contracts (Turck ed. 1929). §17. Unless
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contract is otherwise in proper form, there is no objection to a provision
that the employer shall be entitled to all inventions or patents obtained
during the employment. Question often does arise, however, where the
contract is silent as to the length of its effectiveness, or where it contains a
provision purporting to continue its duration for a specified period after the
termination of the employment. When the courts are faced with this situa-
tion, there are two divergent lines of reasoning which may influence them
in reaching their decisions: first, the desire to protect the employer against
the employee who conceives an idea or makes an invention during the em-
ployment, but who conceals it from the employer, or fails to attempt to patent
it until after the employment ends; second, the reluctance to bind the em-
ployee to the employer in this way after the termination of the employment.
It has been held that it is not against public policy to include such a pro-
vision in the contract, and it will be sustained if the time is reasonable. 21
Similar reasoning has allowed the employer a reasonable time, even in the
absence of express provision.22 Another problem that may arise in con-
nection with the contracts to assign is the extent of the subject matter; just
what type of invention should be deemed included under the contract? If
the contract is precise in its terms, covering only inventionq arising out of
tie employment, or from knowledge acquired therein, there is no difficulty.
However, if the contract is so general that it could include any invention
made by the employee, even though it has no relation to the employment
or to the business of the employer, a literal interpretation might work a
great hardship on the employee and confer on the employer an undeserved
benefit. It is submitted that such general clauses should always be con-
strued narrowly in favor of the employee. 23
Assuming that a contract'to assign of the type discussed in the preceding
paragraph is so drafted as to be valid in all respects, it nevertheless does
not constitute an assignment. 24 It is merely an executory contract to per-
form acts which may possibly occur in the future. An assignment contem-
plates an existing invention. When the inventions are in fact made and
patented, the employer is entitled to bring a bill in equity to compel an assign-
ment if the employee refuses to assign voluntarily.2 5
Although it is generally true that an express contract is necessary to
entitle the employer to the inventions and patents Qf his employee, it has
some adequate consideration is given, for the contract of assignment, the only
way in which it could be sustained would be to deem the transaction a complete
recission of the prior contract of employment, and a substitution of a new one.Normally the facts would tiot support that result. See Schwartzreich v. Ban-
man-Basch. 231 N. Y. 196. 131 N. E. 887 (1921).
21. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Sing.naster, supra note 18. Where the agree-
ment is indefinite in time, it is held to be bad. See Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co.
supra note 18; Guth v. Minnesota Mib. d Mfg. Co., supra note 18. Walker,
op. cit. supra note 5, §323 says that although contracts for unlimited time are
probably void, still, "it may be gathered from the cases that . .. If the pur-pose intended . . . by the contract Is the protection of the other's businessfrom advantages that have or may be gained by the inventor from his relations
with the other, the contract is not void."
22. Wege v. Safe-Cabinet Co., supra note 19 Standard "Plunger Elevator
Co. v. Stokes, 212 F. 893 (C. C. A. 2d. 1914).
23. In Guth v. Minnesota Min. & MAg. Co., supra note 18, it was held that
a contract unlimited as to subject matter should be construed in a narrow way
so as to include only what was within the contemplation of the parties.
24. 2 Robinson, op. cit. supra note 7, §771.25. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U. S. 178, 53 S. Ct. 554(1922). This remedy is essential when It is considered that the employee by
having the patent may prevent the employer from exercising an Invention to
which he may have every right. In form, this is a bill for specific performance.
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already been intimated that under some circumstances the rule is otherwise.26
There are various factors entering into the determination of this question
in the absence of contract, but the controlling principles are those of the
law of master and servant. 27 The application of these principles may not
produce so nearly uniform results in all jurisdictions as is true of the con-
struction of contracts to assign, but in a case where the employer has estab-
lished a valid claim, the variance will be in the extent of the interest awarded
him. Where the employee has been hired to invent, but the employment
contract is silent as to who is entitled to the ownership of any resulting
inventions and of the patents thereon, the authorities are uniform in saying
that all these benefits shall accrue to the employer.2 8 Scarcely less clear is
the employer's right to an invention where the basic idea is his and he em-
ploys mechanics and engineers to effect the mechanical realization of the idea,
nor is the employer's right affected by the fact that the ultimate design
incorporates improvements suggested by the employee.2 9 A situation of
frequent occurrence is where an employee is not employed to invent, but in
the course of his employment he makes an invention relating to the processes
of his employment, either wholly or partly at the expense of the employer
by making use of the equipment, materials, and the help of other employees.
If the case were new and were to be decided on principle, the writer would
be inclined to award the invention and patent to the employer. 30 However,
the weight of authority is that the inventor is entitled to keep his invention,
and that the employer gets a license to use it.31 The foregoing constitute
the principal situations in which the employer may be entitled to the em-
ployee's inventions. Under rare circumstances, where the inventor is more
than a mere employee, courts have inferred a trust relationship between him
and the corporation, and have compelled him to assign his patents to the
corporation32 The fact that the employee involved is employed by the
United States has been held to make no difference, and the Government
has no greater right to the inventions of its employees than an ordinary
employer.8 3 Unquestionably, the same principles apply here as in the case
of the express contract to assign in limiting the subject matter of inventions
over which assignment will be compelled to those arising out of the employ-
ment. Similarly, the employer will be entitled, at most, to only those in-
26. Supra note 16.
27. 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations (1931), §893; 5 Labatt, Master
& Servant (2d ed, 1913), §§2042-47.
28. Solornons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342, 11 S. Ct. 88 (1890) ; Gill v.
United States. 160 U. S. 426, 16 S. Ct. 322 (1896) ; Standard Parts Co. v. Peck,
supra note 18: United States v. Dubilier Condenser Co.. supra note 25.
29. Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 74 U. S. 685 (1869) Union Paper
Colkar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U. S. 530 (1874) ; Borglin v. Palmer, 70 F. (2d) 899
(Ct. C. & Pat. App., 1934) ; Milwaukee v. Activated S?.ndge, supra note 16.
Although this is the general rule, there is a complementary rule that if the
employee goes further and works out some new development, patentable in
itself. he may be entitled to this invention and patent. See McReen v. Jerdone,
34 App. D. C. 163 (1909).
30. Language which might support this view appears in ill v. United
States, supra note 28. where in an action by the employee to collect royalties it
was said that the use of the employee of all the equipment of the employer
raises an inference that the work was done for the benefit of the employer, or
an implication of bad faith on the part of the employee.
31. Hapgood v. Hewitt. supra note 15; Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Mfg.
Co., supra note 15 American Cyanamid Co. v. Hubbell. supra note 15; Chicago
Daily News v. Kohler. 360 II. 351, 196 N. E. 445 (1935).
32. Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308 (1918).
33. Solovnons v. United States, supra note 28: Gill v. United States, supra
note 28: United States v. Dubilier Condenser Co., supra note 25.
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ventions made and patented during the employment and for a reasonable
time thereafter.
In many instances the employer acquires a license or, as it is technically
known, a "shop right" in a patented invention of his employee. As has been
pointed out previously, a license consists of a right to the use of an inven-
tion, but it does not include the power to exercise the monopoly or patent
so as to exclude its use by others.34 Sometimes the license arises out of a
contract, the construction of which is a matter of contract law.35 More
often the license arises by operation of law, its existence being determined
in litigation between the parties. In the latter case, the license arises as a
result of the conduct of the employee.36 Usually the basis for implying a
license is either that the employee has acquiesced in the use by the employer
of some invention of the employee,87 or that the employee has made an in-
vention during the course of his employment at the expense of the employer.38
The duration of an express license is determined by reference to the con-
tract; s9 normally the implied license is irrevocable.40 It is apparent that
the extent of the license granted will vary with the nature of the invention
and the nature of the business of the employer, but in all cases the license
will be as limited as the circumstances permit. 4 1 In general, the license is
considered a personal privilege to the employer and is not assignable.
4 2
In all cases there is a presumption that the patentee is entitled to his
invention.4 S Where there is an express contract to assign, we have seen that
it is possible to obtain specific performance of this contract. Similarly, in
the absence of the contract, where the employer is able to show that in
all good faith he is entitled to an assignment of the patent, he will be able
to obtain this relief by a bill in equity.4 4 In connection with the subject
of good faith it is interesting to note, although it has no direct bearing on
this comment, that when an employee terminates his employment, good
faith requires that he not reveal any secret processes of his former employer
to any third person.
4 5
34. Russei7 v. Boston Card Index Co., 276 F. 4 (C. C. A. 1st, 1921) ; Bell
d6 Howell Co. V. Shoor, 216 Ill. App. 221 (1919).
35. The validity of such contracts has been sustained in the following
eases: Straus'v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 243 U. S. 490, 37 S. Ct. 412 (1917)
Bijur Motor Lighting Co. v. Eclipse Mach. Co.. 243 F. 600 (1917).
36. Hazen Mfg. Co. V. Wareham, 242 F. 642 (1917).
37. Solomons V. United States, supra note 28 ; Gill v. United States, supra
note 28; Neon Signals Co. v. Alpha-Claud Neon Corp., 54 CF. (2d) 793 (1932).
38. Supra note 31. .Amdyco Corp. v. Urquhart, 39 F. (2d) 943 (1930)
American Circ. Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 84 N. E. 133 (1908)
McKinnon Chain Co. V. Amer. Chain Co., 259 F. 873 (1919) ; Mix v. National
Envelope Co., 244 IF. 822 (1916).
39. Straus v. Victor Talking Mach. Co.. supra note 35.40. Neon Signals Co. V. Alpha-Claud Neon Corp., supra note 37; Chicago
Daily News v. Kohler, supra note 31.
41. If the right to make and use is all that is needed, the license will be
so limited. Dunkley Co. v. Cal. Packing Corp., 277 F. 996 (1921); Cinema
Patents Co. V. Columbia Pictures Corp., 62 F. (2d) 310 (1933). Where the
right to sell is necessary to permit of a beneficial use of the license, it will be
allowed. Rickly v, Parlin & Orendorff Co., 215 I1. App. 512 (1919).
42. Hapgood V. Hewitt, supra note 15; General Paint Corp. v. Kramer, 68
F. (2d) 40 (C. C. A. 10th. 1935).
43. Borglin v. Palmer, supra note 29.
44. This type of suit may be brought in the state courts. Pressed Steel
Car Co. v. Hansen, supra note 15: Dalzell v. Dueber Watch Case Co,, supra,
note 15; Quaker St. Oil Refining Co. V. Talbot, supra note 18; Manton-Gaulin
MIg. Co. v. Colony. 255 Mass. 194, 151 N. E. 71 (1926). See Borglin v. Palmer,
supra note 29 concerning the presumption in favor of the patentee.
45. Stone v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 65 N. J. Eq. 756, 55 A. 736 (1903)
Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. 1, 116 N. E. 951 (1917) ; Macbeth-Evans Glass Co.
v. Schnelbach. 239 Pa. 76, 86 A. 688 (1913). See typical contract, supra note 1.
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It is apparent that in all instances principles of equity play an important
part in determining the relative rights of the employer and the employee
to the inventions of the latter. The scope of the subject matter, the dura-
tion of the period during which the employer has a right, and the nature of
his interest are all governed by equitable considerations. Applying these
considerations to the case of an air line pilot and his employer, the writer
is led to the conclusion that in almost all cases an express contract will be
necessary to entitle the employer to the pilot's inventions by assignment.
The duties of the ordinary commercial pilot negative the idea that he is
employed to invent, or to effect mechanical perfection of some idea of the
employer, and for these reasons a duty to assign will not be implied in law.
It is conceded that the rule will be otherwise as to any research and ex-
perimental pilots. Whether the air line company will acquire a shop right
in the pilot's inventions will depend largely on the conduct of the pilot
himself. If he makes use of the tools, equipment, and time of the airline
to develop improvements, or if he permits the company to use his invention,
he will not be heard to complain if the employer is deemed to have a license.
As to the express contracts to assign, it is probable that in some instances
they may fail for lack of consideration.4 s Even if the requirements of
consideration be met, it would still seem that the contract must be construed
very strictly and narrowly because of the nature of the work of the pilot.
In other fields of employment, contracts of this sort have been construed
to include only inventions arising out of the employment, or the special
knowledge acquired therein.47 It is submitted that there is a difference be-
tween the knowledge the pilot acquires because of his employment, and that
coming to him because of his knowing how to fly. For this reason he might
well be entitled to many of his inventions. It is suggested, also, that the
fact that many of the air lines are exclusively operating companies, and
enter into no manufacturing processes, is entitled to some consideration ih
a court of equity in determining whether an employer is entitled to an
assignment of the patents of its pilots.4 8
E. V. MOORE. 49
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-[California] Fox Film Company
hired two cabin planes, through James E. Granger, Inc., from Tanner Motor
Livery, for use as camera planes in filming a parachute jump over the
Pacific Ocean. These planes were specially fitted with dual controls for
this use, and were operated by licensed pilots in the employ of the livery.
Both planes carried a director or assistant director of the film company, who
sat at the alternate control with the licensed pilot in his respective plane;
three other employees of the film company made up the balance of the load
in each plane. The route of flight, position of planes, timing, and all other
46. Supra note 20. It is also important to consider the nature of the
employment contracts of the pilots. Does the fact that the pilots are subject
to Government licensing, which requires frequent examination and the mainte-
nance of certain standards in order to retain the license, make their employment
similar to an employment at will? See supra note 21.
47. Supra note 23.
48. Supra note 1. The Air Mail Law of 1934, as amended, renders this
mandatory of carriers of the mail. 48 Stat. 936 (1934), 49 Stat. 617 (1935) ;
39 USCA, §469e (1935). The provisions of these Acts are set out in 5 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 462 (1934) and 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 594 (1935).
49. Member of the Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University
School of Law.
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particulars were under the supervision of the film company's director.
During the course of the flight, and while the two ships were attempting to
negotiate a left turn, the right ship appeared to side-slip so that the wings
of the two planes met and they fell into the ocean, carrying all occupants
to their death. Eight actions begun by representatives of the deceased em-
ployees of the film company against the broker and the owner of the planes
were tried together. Plaintiffs alleged negligence in general terms, setting
tip the mid-air collision, but offering no evidence in explanation thereof.
The court instructed the jury that, in order for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to be applicable, the plaintiff must first have shown that defendant
must possess or have possessed superior knowledge as to the cause of the
accident, or must be or have been in a better position to obtain that knowl-
edge. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appealed, contending that
the instruction as given was erroneous, in that, by such instruction, de-
fendant was required merely to profess entire ignorance of the cause of the
accident in order to avoid the inference of negligence. Held, that there was
no prejudicial error, since the doctrine res ipsa loquitur could not be applied
without first establishing the fact of exclusive control. Parker v. James E.
Granger, Inc., 90 Cal. Dec. 475, 52 P. (2d) 226 (1935). 1
The above decision has been welcomed as a decisive aid in clarifying
the application of the doctrine in airplane collision cases. That the doctrine
is not applicable in all such cases is apparent from a consideration of its
elements, as stated by the California Supreme Court forty years ago: "When
a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of de-
fendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does
not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence in the absence of explanation by defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care."2 A review of this statement discloses
that two conditions are essential for a proper application: (1) that the
instrumentality or mechanism shall be under the control of defendant; and
(2) that no accident from such mechanism would normally occur except
for negligence of operation.
The leading case involving this doctrine concerned the accidental fall
of a barrel of flour from an upper window of defendant's warehouse;3 it
struck the plaintiff who was passing on the public road below. The court
observed that, as an ordinary thing, barrels of flour do not fall out of
windows unless someone is careless. Just how defendant was negligent,
plaintiff could not say, since his first knowledge thereof was received abruptly
when he was struck without warning. Yet the court felt that when the
thing (i. c., negligence) speaks for itself there is no need of proof by plain-
1. On hearing after decision In the District Court of Ap~peal, 80 Cal. App.
Dec. 201, 39 P. (2d) 833 (1934).
2. Judson v. Giant Power Co., 107 Cal. 549, 556, 40 Pac. 1020, 48 Am. St.
Rep. 146, 29 L. R. A. 718 (1895) : see, also: Harper, Treatise on the Law of
Torts (1st ed. 1933), §77, to the effect that "when certain types of harm occur
under circumstances which, from common experience, strongly suggest negligence
and when the agency or instrumentality which occasioned the harm is under
the exclusive control and management of the defendant so that he is in a
better position to prove his innocence than plaintiff is to prove his negligence,
there exists a res ipsa Ioquitur case." For a general discussion of this topic,
see 5 Wigmore, Evidence (2d ed. 1923), §2509.
3. Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch. 1863), where
the trial court non-suited plaintiff on theory of failure of proof, i. e., an allega-
tion of negligence but no evidence thereof; on appeal the Court of Exchequer
reversed the judgment on the ground that plaintiff had made a prima facie case.
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tiff, hence, unless defendant can clearly show an absence of negligence, the
prima facia case is not rebutted.
The doctrine has been variously applied,4 and is now well established
in California .law, in relation to accidents occurring on the ground.
It is apparent from a consideration of some of the later decisions5 that the
importance of a strict adherence to the elements of the doctrine has been
realized in other connections. A clearly defined concept thereof, in its rela-
tion to accidents involving aircraft, however, has not heretofore been stressed
by the California court. It is of course a question for the trial court whether
the doctrine shall be submitted to the jury at all; it is therefore the court's
duty to determine whether the facts present a true res ipsa loquitur case-
i. e., whether, as a matter of fact, the thing speaks for itself. For con-
venience of analysis we may divide the field into those cases where the
doctrine is applied, and those where it is either refused or merely not
raised. In Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., the court said that "the
rules of law relating to the operation of aircraft, in the absence of statute,
in general are rules relating to negligence . . . and are not distinguishable
from those which relate to the operation of vehicles, perhaps, more closely,
to motor vehicles on land." O In that case, the right wing motor stopped
shortly after the plane took off; the plaintiff contended the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine should apply, since the ship was entirely within the control of de-
fendant, ahd motors do not stop if they have been properly serviced. But
the court said that plaintiff did not show that servicing the motor was a
factor within the control of defendant, or that it had not been serviced
before taking off; the doctrine will not be applied, the court said, "if there
is any other reasonable or probable cause from which it might be inferred
there was no negligence at all; nor does it apply in any instance when the
agency causing the accident is not under the sole and exclusive control of
the person sought to be charged with the injury."7
The New York court also recognized that "it is common knowledge
that airplanes fall in a great many instances from causes over which the pilot
has no control,"8 and it dismissed a cause of action based on a general
allegation of negligence inferred from the fact that defendant's plane col-
lided with plaintiff's electric-power line while making a forced landing at
night. In Seaman v. Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., and Stoll v. Curtiss Flying
Service, Inc.,9 the jury was instructed with regard to the application of the
doctrine, but it will be observed that these cases may be distinguished on the
4. 4 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 429 (1933)-case note by Sam E. Gates on
Smith v. O'Donnell, 67 Cal. App. Dec. 838, 5 P. (2d) 690 (1932).
5. Connor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 189 Cal. 1, 207 P. 378, 26 A. L. R.
1462 (1922) : Damgaard v. Oakland H. S. Dist., 212 Cal. 316, 298 P. 983 (1931)
Manuel v. Pacific G. tf E. Co., 134 Cal App. 512, 25 P. (2d) 509 (1933).
6. Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport, Inc., 278 Mass. 420, 425. 180 N. E.
212, 214 (1932).
7. See footnote No. 6, supra.
8. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co. v. Dunlop, 266 N." Y. S. 469, 472, 148 Misc.
849 (1933) ; see, also: Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 271 N. Y. S.
1107 (App. Div. 1934), saying that the mere fact that an accident occurred does
not, in and of itself, make the defendant liable in damages to plaintiff.
9. Seaman v. Curtiss F~ying Service, Inc., 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S.
251 (1930), where an airplane in perfect condition crashed shortly after taking
off, there being no evidence as to the cause, it was said that the jury should
be instructed as to the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In Stoll v.
Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., 236 App. Dlv. 664, 257 N. Y. S. 1010 (1932), it was
said that, in an airplane accident case, plaintiff may show that defendant has
been negligent either by proof of specific acts of negligence or, under circum-
stances of the particular case, by relying on the presumption of res ipsa loquitur.
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fact that defendant was a common carrier, and that the accident occurred
in daylight and under normal conditions. The Texas court indicated that
it would apply the doctrine to a common carrier, except that in the par-
ticular case it was prevented by a rule of procedure.' 0 The Illlinois court
had for consideration a case where the defendant was not operating as a
common carrier, and in such circumstances it was said that, in the absence
of actual proof of negligence, none would be inferred."
In the principal case we are told that dual controls were installed pre-
vious to the fatal flight at the order of the charterer, but that neither the
film director who occupied the extra control position of the one plane, nor
the assistant director who sat at the auxiliary control mechanism of the
other, was a licensed pilot. It would seem, then, that there might be
some reasonable doubt as to the sole and exclusive control of defendant's
agents at the moment of the accident.1 2 In his article on "Res Ipsa Loquitur
in Air Law," Professor Harper says: "If the instrument or agency which
precipitated the injury is not under the exclusive control of the defendant,
the basis for presumption of legal cause falls. The injury might just as
readily be caused by the negligence of a third person as by defendant's
presumed negligence. When the injury will support the one as well as the
other hypothesis, the usual and general rule applies, and plaintiff must make
out a prima facie case by actual proof."" The same idea is expressed by
Mr. Davis, of the California Bar, in his article on "The California Doctrine
of Res Ipsa Loquitur."14
That the second essential element of the doctrine was present in the
principal case may also be doubted. In the Dunlop case, it was said' that the
operation of aircraft is not in such a state of efficiency that it can be said
that "if the proper degree of care is used, a collision in mid-air does not
ordinarily occur. The mere fact that a collision occurred should not raise
the benefit of the doctrine for plaintiff, and cast upon defendant the burden
of excusing a presumed negligence which may be as unexplainable to him
as to plaintiff."1 5 In these cases it usually happens that none of the parties
to the litigation was either a principal in the accident or saw the occurrence
and that, if it is tlierefore difficult for plaintiff to prove actual negligence,
it is equally hard for defendant to show absence of fault; and since it can
not invariably be said that no accident will occur except when defendant
or his agent is negligent, it is submitted that the doctrine should not be
invoked in mid-air collision cases.
It has been said that "rules for determining the liability of aviators
should be sought in the law relating to negligence and nuisance,"' 6 and Sec-
10. English v. Miller, 43 S. W. (2d) 642 (Texas, 1931).
11. Bird, Admr. v. Louer, 272 111. App. 522 (1933).
12. See 90 Cal. Dec. 475, 480, 52 P. (2d) 226, 229 (1935).
13. 1 Air Law Review 478 (1930); see, also: 19 Cal. Jur., Negligence,§126: "It does not apply where an unexplained accident might have been
caused by plaintiff's negligence, or been due to one of several causes, for some of
which defendant is not responsible."
14. 5 Air Law Review 28, 36 (1934): "The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is
applicable only where defendant is proved to have been in control of an instru-
mentality which caused the accident, and that no inference of negligence on the
part of defendant proximately resulted in the accident arises where the fact of
the accident speaks equally in favor of negligence on the part of another or
others as solely causing the accident."
15. 5 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 655 (1934)-comment by Saul N. Rittenberg, on
Rochester Gas d. Elec. Co. v. Dunlop, 266 N. Y. S. 469, 148 Misc. 849 (1933).
16. 2 Air Law Rev. 9 (1931)-article byiOsterhout, "Doctrine of Res Ipsa
Loqultur as Applied to Aviation," and footnote No. 2 at page 10 thereof.
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insure the comfort, convenience, safety, and health of the passengers. In the
light of these objectives, the decision in the instant case appears justified.
Because of the restricted quarters on a plane, the presence of a sick
passenger has a strong psychological effect on the comfort of the other
passengers; and the close proximity of the passengers to each other enhances
the possibility of contagion and a feeling of repulsion in the passengers who
had innocently assumed, as was their right, the existence of safe and com-
fortable flying conditions. Moreover, the necessity for an unscheduled
landing which would be necessitated by an adverse change in the condition
of the stricken passenger, as in the instant case, might interfere with the
duty of the carrier to provide a regular and convenient schedule upon which
the public may rely. The safety factor, which is of controlling interest, is
manifestly affected by the presence of a sick passenger who might create
confusion and panic among the passengers which in turn might affect the
pilot's control of the plane.5
From the viewpoint of the carrier as a business enterprise, the power
of exclusion of diseased passengers is essential in order to prevent liability
to passengers contracting disease on the plane.6 The comfort and enjoyment
of the passengers is reflected in their continued patronge which is of increas-
ing importance in view of the competition between the various modes of
transportation. In this respect, the ability to maintain a reputation for
prompt schedules and safe flying conditions is of signal importance in ad-
vertising for public patronage.
Since the layman is not usually aware of the effects of air travel upon
a passenger who is not physically fit, it would appear that the carrier is
under a duty to make clear to such a passenger the probable effects the trip
would have upon him and the conditions which may be met.7 If the carrier
accepts a passenger knowing his condition, every reasonable care should be
taken, and this duty, once assumed, should continue coextensively with any
obligation it owes to the other passengers. The court in the instant case
emphasized the high duty of considerate treatment until actual ejectment
of the disabled passengers-a duty which seems to have been well met in
the instant situation.9
EDWARD M. GLAZIER. 10
5. In this respect, it is interesting to note the dependence upon the human
element in the control of the airplane. Mr. Quindry (supra note 2, p. 489)
points out that, under modern conditions, flying depends approximately 90%
on the pilot and 10% on the plane.
6. Bogard's Adm'r v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., supra note 4 (passenger sued
carrier because of disease contracted from another passenger).
7. But a reasonable rule promulgated by the carrier need not be com-
municated to each Individual if it is of general usage and custom, in which
case all persons are presumed to be aware of it. Brumfield v. Consolidated
Coach Corp., supra note 3, p. 364. For a case of historical interest on the
subject, see Pearson v. Duane, 71 U. S. 605, 18 L. Ed. 448 (1866).
8. Conolly v. Crescent City R. R. Co., supra note 4, discussing the degree
of care exacted from the carrier towards the sick passenger. This case, how-
ever, is distinguishable from the present case where the carrier had knowledge
of the condition of the applicant before acceptance.
9. It is Interesting to speculate on the allegation of the plaintiff that the
pilot deliberately made the trip as uncomfortable as possible. A pilot, unlike
the captain of an ocean liner or the engineer of a train, can very easily frighten
an undesirable passenger and in an almost undetectable manner. While this
might be a method of extra-legal pressure, the presence of the other passengers
would prevent such a practice from becoming a usual one.
10. Member of the Legal Publications Board, Northwestern University
School of Law.
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DIGESTS
Administrative Law-Customs Duties-Jurisdiction of District Court
Over Plane Flying Above District.-[Federal] Loaded with smuggled
liquor, respondent plane left the airport at St. Catherines, Canada, crossed
the international boundary, proceeded over a portion of the Western District
cf New York and a portion of the State of Pennsylvania, entered Ohio and
landed at Youngstown. In violation of the Tariff Act no report was made
to the customs officials and the goods were disposed of. The owner then
ordered the pilot to make another trip but the Canadian police seized the
plane in St. Catherines as it was being loaded and arrested the pilot. The
plane was then sent back to the United States by wagon and was seized
at the boundary by customs officials operating from the Western District of
New York and an action for forfeiture was brought in the United States
District Court for the same district. Defendant's counsel contended that
this court had no jurisdiction as the plane did not land in its district but
merely flew over it, and that the libel action should have been brought, if
at all, in the district where the plane landed. Held: the court had juris-
diction over the airspace above the territorial boundaries of the district, and
a plane transporting goods in violation of the Tariff Act is subject to the
jurisdiction of the court of any district over which it passes. United States
v. One Pitcairn Bi-Plane, Registration No. NC-5062, Engine No. AD-8285,
11 F. Supp. 24 (D. C. N. Y., April 22, 1935).
Administrative Law-Statute-Aircraft Not "Vessel" or "Vehicle"
Within Meaning of Tariff Act.-[Federal] A Fokker monoplane com-
ing from the British West Indies landed in Florida in violation of Sections
459 and 460 of the Tariff Act of 1930 which requires notification to the
nearest customs officials. Upon seizure of the plane, a libel for forfeiture
was filed by the government in accordance with the act, and Hunter, who
held a $400 purchase money mortgage on the plane was allowed to intervene.
The trial court held that the Tariff Act was not applicable to aircraft and
awarded the proceeds of the sale of the plane to Hunter. Held: judgment
affirmed. Sections 459 and 460 requiring notification to the customs officials
by the person in charge of "vessels" or "vehicles" arriving from "contiguous
countries" with merchandise does not include aircraft by the express terms
of Section 401 (a) (b). However, the Secretary of the Treasury under
Section 644 of the Tariff Act, and the Secretary of Commerce, under Sec-
tion 7 of the Air Commerce Act, are given'the power to apply any provision
of the Tariff Act to aircraft. This has been done by the Secretary of the
Treasury in Regulations, Article 253 and Article 254. Forfeiture of the
craft must still be based on the provisions of the Tariff Act which refers
to "contiguous" countries. The British West Ihdies, being separated from
the United States by the high seas, is not such a "contiguous" country within
the meaning of the act and forfeiture should not be adjudged. United
States v. L. M. Hunter, 235 C. C. H. 2802 (U. S. C. A., Fifth Circuit, decided
January 3, 1936).
Airports-Municipal Corporations-Leases.-[California] Plaintiff, a
taxpayer, brought action against the City of Los Angeles to compel cancella-
tion of two lease agreements pertaining to land used as a municipal airport
and to compel the City of Los Angeles to discontinue and abandon the opera-
tion of the airport on the grounds that: (1) the leases were void because
the aggregate of the total amount of rental installments to be paid by the city
exceeded the income and revenue provided for the necessary and
requisite expenditures of the city for the year, in violation of a state con-
stitutional provision that a municipal debt incurred in any year shall not
exceed the income and revenue provided for such year without the assent of
the voters of the city; (2) the charter of the City of Los Angeles
prohibits the city from engaging in any "purely commercial or industrial
enterprise" without the approval of the voters of the city manifested at an
election, the conduct of the municipal airport falling within that prohibition,
and no phase of the lease or maintenance of the airport having been sub-
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mitted to the voters of Los Angeles. Demurrers to the complaint were
sustained and judgment of dismissal entered, from which plaintiff appealed.
Held: judgment affirmed. The lease of land to the City of Los Angeles at
an annual rental payable in equal monthly installments for a term of years
for a municipal airport, with option to purchase, is valid and does not create
an indebtedness for future rentals, in excess of the installment of rent
presently due, within the meaning of the constitutional limitatio5 . The con-
duct and maintenance of an airport by a municipality is a public enterprise,
not a "purely commercial or industrial enterprise" prohibited by the charter
of the-City unless approved by the voters of the City. Krenwinkle v. City of
Los Angeles et al, 51 P. (2d) 1098 (Supreme Court of California, decided
November 20, 1935).
Contracts-Infants-Flying School Course as a Necessary.-[Massa-
chusetts] This is an action of contract to recover the sum of sixteen hun-
dred (1600) dollars and interest paid to the defendant under contracts made
during the infancy of the plaintiff. The writ is dated July 11, 1931, return-
able the second Saturday in August, 1931, with an ad damnurn of three thou-
sand (3000) dollars.
I find the facts to be substantially as follows: The plaintiff, a minor,
entered into a contract with the defendant, the Curtiss-Wright Flying Service,
Inc., for instruction as a private pilot, on September 25, 1929. The cost of
the course was three hundred (300) dollars, and the same was completed and
paid for. On February 27, 1930, the plaiptiff entered into a contract with
the defendant for a course of instruction as a limited commercial pilot, the
cost of the course being thirteen hundred (1300) dollars. The course was
completed and paid for. On May 6, 1930, the plaintiff entered into a contract
with the defendant for a course of instruction as a transport pilot, the cost
of the course being thirty-two hundred (3200) dollars. This course was not
completed, and no amount was paid on account of cost of same. At the
timc these contracts were signed.' the plaintiff was a minor. The plaintiff
vluntarily withdrew from the transport pilot's course in May, 1930, and
attained his majority on July 20, 1930. On February 28, 1931, after receiving
notice that he owed a balance of forty-eight dollars and fifty-five cents
($48.55), on account of the instruction received under the third contract, he
visited the office of the attorney for the defendant at New Bedford, Mass.,
and stated that he did not owe any money to the defendant. He did not
disaffirm his contracts until July 11, 1931, when he brought the present action.
The plaintiff is the son of a textile weaver employed at New Bedford, Mass.
He went to work at the age of sixteen, as a plumber's helper. Later, he
worked in an auto garage, earning on an average of twenty (20) dollars
per week, and later did some laboring work at twenty-two (22) dollars per
week. He left for New York in the early part of 1929, and went to work for
Carpen Brothers as an upholsterer, earning on an average of twenty-four (24)
dollars per week. He left this job to take the course of flying instruction
from the defendant. At this time his folks had accumulated two thousand
(2000) dollars, and he, himself, had accumulated four hundred (400) dollars.
He took the course "because he wanted to learn a new trade and earn a
good living." The plaintiff failed to qualify as a private pilot, or as a
limited commercial pilot, although he had taken examinations for same. He
has been unable to obtain work in any commercial flying service as a result
of having taken this course.
It is agreed by counsel for the parties hereto that the law of the State
of New York is applicable to this case.
I find that the plaintiff was a minor at the time the contracts were made;
that he was a minor at the time of the execution of the first and second
contracts and at the time that he left the school in May, 1930, during his in-
struction under the third contract. I find that he disaffirmed his contracts
1. It has been explained that the opinion of the court does not cover the
entire situation, since Adamowski's suit for a refund of tuition actually was a
cross-action to the suit instituted by Curtiss-Wright Flying Service against him
for $48.55, balance due.
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and that the disaffirmance was within a reasonable time after attaining his
majority. I further find that the courses of instruction were not necessaries
for the plaintiff.
I rule that under the law of the State of New York, the plaintiff, having
received from the defendant only an intangible right, in the nature of flying
school instruction, is not chargeable for the benefit, if any, received from such
instruction. International Text Book Co. v. Connolly, 286 N. Y. 188; Green
v. Green. 69 N. Y. 553; Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578; Wyatt v. Lortscher,
216 N. Y. Supp. 571; McCarthy v. Bowling Green Storage Co., 169 N. Y..
Supp. 463.
The plaintiff seasonably filed ten requests for rulings, all of which I
allow.
The defendant seasonably filed five requests for rulings, all of which
are denied.
Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of twenty-one hundred sixty-three($2163) dollars. 2
Contracts - Bailment - Disregard of Bailor's Instructions. - INew
Yorkl Defendant,' a licensed pilot, hired a plane from the plaintiff for a
short flight at a rental which the court found as seven dollars a day. Evi-
dence showed that the plane, a two seater, had a tendency toward nose-
heaviness when operated from the front cockpit without a rear passenger. De-
fendant contended that the "stick" in the front cockpit was not fastened with a
bolt, but that the plaintiff had told him a bolt was unnecessary. Plaintiff denied
this and claimed he definitely admonished the defendant not to operate the
plane without a passenger in the rear. The defendant had takn his passenger
to Newark and, after depositing him there, returned to Floyd Bennett field
in New York, Ivith the rear cockpit empty. Upon trying to land, the plane
went into a nose dive about thirty-five feet above the ground and was dam-
aged. Conflicting testimony was presented as to whether the damage was
due to the "pulling out" of the "stick" or by the nose-heaviness of the craft.
Held: judgment for the plaintiff. The court found that the defendant knew
of the nose-heaviness of the plane, that the plaintiff had admonished the
defendant as alleged, and that the damage had not resulted from the "pulling
out" of the "stick" as the pilot in such a situation could impart an upward
thrust to the plane by giving it full throttle and thus afford himself an
opportunity to reattach the "stick" and regain control. The defendant, as
bailee, was bound to heed the bailor's instructions and was liable for dam-
ages upon failure to do so. Whitehead v. Johnson, 235 C. C. H. 4011 (Mtn
Ct., N. Y. City, Jan. 12, 1934).
Contracts-Seaplane-Liens-Customs Duties.-[Federal] The United
States filed its libel in rem against one Fairchild Seaplane, No. NC 142 H,
to recover penalties aggregating $2,100 assessed by the Secretary of the
Treasury for violations of certain sections of the Air Commerce Act of
1926, the Tariff Act of 1930, and the Customs Regulations of 1931, and to
enforce its lien for said penalties. Appellee filed an intervening libel, claim-
ing a lien in the sum of $1,268.72 for making repairs to said seaplane, and
prayed that its lien be declared prior and superior to that of .the United
States. The facts were not disputed and showed that the violations for
which the penalties were awarded occurred on July 26, 1932, after which
the plane alighted on a part of the navigable waters of Puget Sound and
was subsequently removed to a hangar and its motor and pontoons sent to
appellee's shop in Seattle for repairs. Before the repairs were completed,
the seaplane was seized by customs officers of the United States for the
2. The opinion of PATRICK M. DOYLE, Special Justice, is set out in full.
The decision of the Third District Court (No. 2766) of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts was handed down during the last of February, 1936, in the case
of John P. Adamowski v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc. No date, however,
appears on the decision, copy of which has been furnished through the courtesy
of Mr. Cyril Hyde Condon of Wherry, Condon & Forsyth of New York City,
New York. It is understood that an appeal has been taken.
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violations. Neither the lien of the United States for the penalties awarded,
nor that of appellee for the repairs made, was disputed; the question was
one of priority, appellee contending that the seaplane was a vessel within
the maritime jurisdiction of the United States and that it therefore held
a maritime lien which was superior to the penalty of the United States.
The District Court awarded the penalties prayed for by the United States,
but held its lien to be inferior to that of appellee. Held: on appeal, reversed
and remanded, with directions. Although a seaplane, while afloat on navi-
gable waters of the United States, may be a vessel within the admiraltyjurisdiction, it is not such a vessel while stored in a hangar, on dry land,
with its engine in a shop, also on dry land, undergoing repairs, nor does the
making of such repairs create a maritime lien. Appellee's lien was no better
than a lien against an ordinary airplane and therefore inferior to the penalty
lien of the United States. United States v. Northwest Air Service, Inc., 80
F. (2d) 804 (Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, decided December 20,
1935).
Negligence-Injuries Sustained in Parachute Jump-Evidence.-
[Illinois] The plaintiff, an experienced parachute jumper, made a jump
from an airplane on July 25, 1931, from a height of 2,500 feet. He was
equipped with two parachutes, a primary and emergency parachute which
had been packed by defendant's agent, a licensed "rigger," but which failed
to open, thereby allowing him to fall to the earth and sustain severe injuries.
The evidence disclosed that when the plaintiff jumped from the plane the
primary parachute opened only partially and failed to retard his fall suffi-
ciently, whereupon he pulled the cord of the emergency 'chute, which failed
entirely to open. He sued to recover damages for the injuries sustained,
charging negligent and improper preparing and folding of the parachute by
the defendant. Defendant filed a plea of not guilty, contending that plaintiff
failed to prove any negligence on the part of it or its agents or servants
in preparing, packing, arranging and folding said parachute. Upon a trial
of the cause before the lower court and a jury, judgment was entered against
the defendant for $5,000 and costs. Held: on appeal, affirmed. The doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur does not apply where there is evidence of specific negli-
gence. It was properly a question for the jury to determine from all of the
evidence and circumstances in the case whether the defendant was guilty as
charged, and whether or not the parachutes failed to open when operated,
and there was sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's findings. The admission
of evidence of possession of an emergency parachute by the plaintiff was
not error to justify a reversal, even though plaintiff's declaration made no
mention of the emergency parachute, inasmuch as such evidence refuted any
charge of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. Jack Cope,
Appellee v. Air Associates, Inc., Appellant, 283 I11. App. 40 (Appellate Court
of Illinois, opinion filed Dec. 27, 1935). An appeal has been taken to the
Illinois Supreme Court.
Trespass-Nuisance-Low Flying Near Municipal Airport.-[Iowa]
A correction should be made in the statement of facts involved in Tucker
v. United Air Lines, Inc., as published in 6 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 622 (1935).
The correction relates to the order in which the two petitions were filed.
The attorney who handled the case for the air line has written the following
explanatory statement: "Both were filed the same day. Our petition had
been prepared for some time but action in court was delayed with the
understanding that Mr. Tucker would not proceed with the erection of
obstructions. When we learned he was planting trees near the boundary
fence we immediately proceeded to the court house and filed our petition and
applied to the court for an injunction. On arriving at the court house we
found that Mr. Tucker had filed a petition on the same day."
After the planting of the trees, referred to, the prayer of the petitioning
air line was changed to read, "that the defendant be restrained from erecting
trees, poles or other obstructions .... ." (Italics ours.)
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A United Press dispatch from Iowa City, Iowa, March 24, 1936, states
that: "Trancontinental airmail and passenger service into Iowa City was
disrupted today by erection of a pole, twenty-four feet and eight inches high,
on the Frew Tucker farm opposite the landing runway at the Iowa City
airport.
"The pole, topped by a fluttering red flag, was erected by Tucker yester-
day following a protracted District court fight last spring during which
Tucker protested that United Airlines' planes, in setting down on the Iowa
City field, clipped branches off his trees and frightened his mules into running
away.
"When the pole went up, United Airlines at Chicago immediately can-
celled all plane stops here and ordered airmail carried into and out of Iowa
City by train.
"Today the Chamber of Commerce here pondered a means of settling
the dispute between Tucker and the Airlines officials.
"Tucker, during his District court fight, had been restrained from erect-
ing obstructions higher than twenty-five feet along the boundary of his farm
and the airport. The airline was enjoined from flying its planes lower than
thirty feet over Tucker's farm.
"Tucker listened to the complaints of Chamber of Commerce officials
and informed them the troublesome flag pole was erected, 'as a sort of
measuring device to see to it that Airlines fellows keep their part of the
court order.' "
1. From The Chicago Daily News, March 24, 1936.
